Blog Post 3: Drones and Democracy

John Raymond

            The past two days of readings and lecture have covered multiple topics that are worth discussing further, but I am going to focus on the use of drones and the implications, or lack thereof, for democracy.  Peter Singer outlines some important points about the use of drone warfare and how it is causing a circumvention of the political process used for making decisions about war.  At face value, Singer’s arguments seem to have some valid points, but Carpenter’s article in which he discusses said points, reveals that what Singer is highlighting are not necessarily drone specific issues, but a more general trend in the political decisions surround warfare.  Moreover, Carpenter also mentions the statements that Singer makes that sound reasonable, but should not necessarily be taken at face value without further investigation.  By taking Singer’s argument at face value, without further analysis, the reader will unduly place importance on drones as a tool and assign consequences to drone use that should not be assumed.

            Firstly, Singer asserts that the use of drones inherently causes war to be viewed in a manner that is different than traditional conflict, and is not treated with the same gravity due to the absence of risk to US personnel during drone strikes.  He says that despite the lack of US casualties in drone strikes, or personnel on the ground, there are still things being destroyed and people being killed, therefore, drone strikes should receive more consideration and be brought into the political realm to be debated and decided on.  I would agree that drone strikes should be given serious thought and treated with the same importance as deploying troops into combat.  However, Carpenter and I both disagree that the circumvention of traditional political policies regarding war initiation are caused by the use of drones themselves.  Carpenter quotes another writer, saying that Congress and the President should be held accountable for the executive use of continued drone strikes, without Congressional approval.  The same issue could be brought about by the use of cruise missiles, conventional airstrikes, or the use of small special operations teams.  The tool is not the issue; it is the manner in which they are used that should be addressed.  There is no reason continued drone strikes could not be treated with the same gravity, and Congressional oversight, as “traditional” war.

            Additionally, Carpenter mentions Singer’s claims that drone strikes and other stand-off weapon systems make conflict easier and more likely, and that the public would then be more willing to agree to the use of such weapons.   In my previous blog post, I mentioned the movie “Ender’s Game”, and how Ender was willing to destroy the enemy planet because he believed he was engaging in a simulation.  Although in the movie, Ender was more likely to kill because he believed it was not real, the same conclusion does not necessarily follow for drone strikes.  Although it initially seems like a plausible claim, there is no reason that drone strikes intrinsically mean devaluation of human life and the moral weight of combat.  In order to make such claims, data would need to be collected, and other factors controlled for.  Carpenter also discusses the point that governments can and do deceive their citizens into agreeing to war, the minimal risks that are associated with drone strikes are unimportant if the government could simply lie about the risks associated with a more traditional conflict.  Like Singer’s point about stand-off weapons leading to more conflict, this too seems like a reasonable idea, but is something that warrants actual evidence in order for a reader to put faith in it.