John Raymond
It seems that the necessity of drone
strikes, and the NSA’s metadata collection program, is questionable at best. Although both sure produce some results,
their actual operational benefit is not clear. First I will address the drone strikes, and
then discuss the metadata surveillance program.
The data from the New America
Foundation seems to indicate that the drone strikes are essentially doing their
job. Civilian casualties number roughly
10% of the total deaths, and the number of militants killed numbers in the
thousands. Based solely on those numbers,
the drone strike program is effective at killing militants and minimizing
collateral damage. But there are a few problems with the conclusion
that drone strikes are strategically effective and necessary. Firstly, there is the obvious debate over the
actual numbers. Muhammad Idrees Ahmad
points out inconsistencies in the NAF’s data and asserts that they are uncannily
similar to official administration reports.
Additionally, he mentions examples of people believed to have been
killed by drone strikes, who later reappear.
Ultimately, I do not think there will ever be an objective number,
intelligence gathering methods are not perfect, and even if they were, the reported
numbers can still depend on the particular organizations bias. Secondly, it is unclear if the militants who
are killed are even of high strategic value.
That information is likely harder to access, as well as classified. Maybe they are bomb-makers or upper level commanders,
or maybe they are of lesser importance but are simply a target of opportunity. Furthermore, the fight against terrorism is
not something that is won by killing everyone who poses a threat. Blindly killing terrorists only serves to
create more anger and animosity towards the US.
Even if the drone strikes mostly kill high-value targets, and with
minimal civilian acts of violent imperialism on the part of the US, or create
new hatreds of the US and its allies, are they actually productive? Part of the issue is the number of people who
dislike the US because of its foreign policy and actions around the globe. Killing is not the solution to that aspect of
the problem.
In regards to the NSA data
collection program, even Gen. Keith Alexander admitted that in only two
situations did metadata collection prevent terrorist activities that would have
otherwise continued. Is it useful to
some degree? Surely it is, otherwise it
would not exist. However, Bergen and his
associates make the argument that most of 50 odd cases cited, could have been
accomplished without the use of the collection program. I think what is most telling is Gen.
Alexander’s testimony. If it were the
case that the collection program was absolutely vital to defeating most
terrorist plots, he would have said so.
The metadata collection program is a tool in the intelligence toolbox,
but the reason for the adamant support of it may be for reasons other than
foiling terrorist plots. Greenwald’s
book alludes to presentations and documents, taken from the Snowden files,
detailing the NSA’s desire to “collect it all” in order to assert dominance
over the global economic and communication network. It is very possible that the desire for the
US to observe and be able to dominate other countries and non-US companies is
in part the reason for having such programs in place. If that is the case, that brings on another
set questions: do economic dominance or other non-terrorism objectives justify
these programs? Are those things the
United States should even be engaging in at all? Is it necessary? Is it morally permissible? Although important, those questions lead us
into a very different area of discussion.
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